Reincarnated as Nikolai II

Napoleon's artillery established the formula 'mobility = firepower' a century ago, developing doctrine of continuously moving while firing.

Looking closely at the Battle of Friedland, where he gave that famous "Action Front!" order commanding half to advance and half to fire with plenty of shells, shows how fanatical Napoleon was about mobile artillery.

One artillery unit fires shells while others advance. Then when the advanced artillery units begin firing, those firing from behind move.

This method, like 13th century Mongol cavalry shooting arrows while mounted, created an illusion to enemies that Napoleon's artillery was firing while moving.

A century passed since then.

Europe remained shackled to mobile artillery doctrine well into the 20th century, with armies pouring massive resources into developing and maintaining extensive cannon parks and field gun divisions. Military theorists and generals clung stubbornly to these principles, even as new technologies emerged.

What European nation would risk departing from the artillery-centered warfare doctrines established by Napoleon Bonaparte - the legendary commander who had transformed warfare and built an empire stretching across the continent through his mastery of concentrated cannon fire and mobile artillery tactics? His influence loomed large over military thinking decades after his defeat.

The German First and Second Armies, following the ambitious Schlieffen Plan in 1914, advanced with remarkable speed through neutral Belgium, covering vast distances in their attempt to outflank and encircle the French forces. Their massive columns of troops and artillery stretched for miles as they executed this bold maneuver, though the logistical strain of maintaining such a rapid advance would eventually contribute to the plan's failure.

Foch's French XX Corps piercing enemy formations in Alsace-Lorraine.

The French mobile army when France and Germany had their decisive battle at the Marne staking Paris.

Though their strategies and tactics might have differed, their artillery usage methods were always consistent.

No army could abandon Napoleon's mobile artillery with mobility in actual combat.

No, all Western Front armies rather fanatically believed in it.

"Quick aiming and rapid fire surpassing existing guns! Mortars are the future!"

"The front is too long! How can we fill this massive front with artillery firepower! Need to build artillery brigades to use quickly just when needed!"

"Even with artillery technology advancing, accurately hit trenches less than 2m wide with indirect fire? From far away too? Isn't artillery emerging to fire when infantry advances the answer?"

Though technological advancement meant artillery no longer needed to move like in Napoleon's era, artillery doctrine development was all based on the 18th century.

"Creeping barrage! Fire gradually with 100-yard intervals per minute to hide our forces! Split artillery lines in two for this!"

Birth of new tactics based on Napoleon's history of alternating fire between artillery brigades.

"Must strengthen interdiction fire! They say advance is possible by providing interdiction fire around offensive points to restrict enemy artillery and infantry mobility?"

Development of interdiction fire tactics blocking enemy approach instead of killing them.

"Haven't you seen what the Marne hero General Foch advocated! Placing artillery between trenches and firing until enemy charges trenches then retreating to rear trenches to fire again! Must follow artillery doctrine boasting such supreme efficiency!"

Tearful efforts to somehow use artillery firepower efficiently even in trench warfare. Now artillery even crosses trench lines directly.

Proving humans walk toward lesser evil even in worst situations, the Western Front tried somehow to develop this doctrine.

However, on the Eastern Front conversely:

"Barrel overheated, barrel change!"

"Barrel change!"

"Change complete! Ready to fire! One round loaded!"

"Gunner ready, fire!"

"Fire!"

Doctrine couldn't develop.

No, there was simply no reason to fill between trenches with 75mm guns, and since they barely conducted offensives, they didn't know about howitzer rapid fire or occupation interdiction fire.

Even if they knew.

"Uh... advance with all these medium guns?"

"Impossible. Just impossible."

"Assuming six horses and one vehicle per medium gun... ugh, let's just abandon them here?"

Good heavens, mobile artillery? What kind of horrible doctrine is this?

Should they have retreated from Poland?

No.

Were they going to advance further from Poland?

No.

Then was there reason for Eastern Front artillery to have mobility?

No.

"Uh... advance toward enemy lines dragging 4-ton 155mm guns? Can't use these on flat ground. Best to dig holes and embed them to use from behind."

"To use while horses pull and people move requires under 1.5 tons, but except 76mm everything's 4-5 tons right? Once guns are set up they're hard to move."

"Huh? This is the region's new landmark?"

Originally reasons artillery caliber increased in the Great War were:

1.) Trench warfare becoming war of attrition, individual battles becoming tremendously large.

2.) Such massive battles requiring appropriate firepower and heavy guns.

3.) Under 100mm unnecessary, unconditionally 150mm, 210mm. Even 350mm, 380mm, 420mm guns appearing completely sacrificing mobility.

4.) Firing hundreds of thousands, millions of rounds with these huge guns.

Though this should develop year by year in this order.

Roman's Northwestern Army Group attempting offensive completely skipped this third step, artillery transformation process.

They recognized cause 1 and necessity 2, connecting straight to action 4.

Kokovtsov had delivered massive shells to Poland via Warsaw railway within limits rear economy could endure.

"Each shell we fire now blocks one enemy bullet!"

"If we can't make that area no man's land, our troops all die going there!"

"They say modern high-explosive shells burrow into ground then explode late, so enemies die even if they just fall near trenches!"

Roman wasn't one to spare shells over his own soldiers.

No mountains anyway and no rivers hindering advance. This Polish region itself is all flat.

"Did we bombard this area too?" Read exclusive content at empire

"Bombarded right next to it but seems we didn't there. Since it's somewhat away from advance route..."

"How dare you! How do you know where enemies hide! Quickly bombard here too!"

No obstacles or debris littered the battlefield, leaving a clear line of sight and unobstructed path for artillery and small arms fire across the entire combat zone.

Naturally, this peculiar situation was utterly baffling to the German forces who had taken defensive positions and were preparing for engagement with the enemy. Their military doctrine and experience had taught them to expect and plan for various forms of cover and concealment.